Missile Tech Rules in New World Order

As the Trump administration adopts a unilateral approach to arms control and regional defense, customary avenues of discussion are being reassessed, including multilateral export controls.

What had become "Wassenaar Minus One," as Russia became a pariah state, is becoming "Less Two," as Washington abandons the forum as well.  Assistant Secretary of Commerce Jeffrey Kessler's recent dismissal of the Arrangement as a waste of time, money and negotiating leverage said out loud what had been expected.

Quantum Rule Tried

The September 6, 2024 rule on semiconductors, quantum and additive manufacturing [89 FR 72926]  claims "America's alliances are some of our greatest assets and that leading with diplomacy means standing shoulder to shoulder and working closely with our allies and key partners, thereby protecting the world against those who do not share our values.

"This is especially true in export controls, as controls adopted by supplier countries, working together, are typically the most effective path to protect our national security and advance our foreign policy objectives," the rule read.

The Quantum Rule introduced a new framework for plurilateral export controls, including a license exception that allows exports to countries that have equivalent export controls on certain emerging technologies.

Wassenaar Less One

This policy in part evolved as the Wassenaar Arrangement proved too slow moving and cumbersome for effective controls of emerging technologies, leading participants to seek out common, or complementary export controls.   In a paper last fall, Altynay Junusova and William Reinsch of CSIS discuss the "minus One" approach and possible ways to making it work.

1. Expelling Russia, the simple fix will not work.  Such a measure would require the Kremlin's consent.
2. Starting over would call for too great a political and practical lift for the actors, including a re-establishment of the control lists already enshrined in member state's controls.

"Regulating dual-use technologies at both the national and international levels is increasingly difficult," the authors conclude. "There are many more suppliers of dual-use technologies beyond the regime members. Fewer than 40 countries, for instance, are willing to enforce stringent export controls, while nearly 150 nations exist in a “grey zone” with weak oversight."

Call for Update of Biden MTCR

In the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Debak Das critiques the Biden administration’s January 2025 update to U.S. policy on the implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The revised guidance enables the United States to support the transfer of MTCR Category I items—including long-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, space launch vehicles, and unmanned aerial systems—to allied nations.

A fact sheet released by the White House on January 7 asserts that the new guidance will “advance nonproliferation goals and bolster allied defense capabilities.”

Das argues the opposite: that relaxing long-standing restrictions on the export of nuclear-capable missile systems undermines the MTCR’s credibility and weakens the broader nonproliferation regime. He warns that this shift sets a dangerous precedent for other MTCR members and non-members, such as Russia and China, potentially accelerating global missile proliferation.

Historically, Category I items have been subject to a strong presumption of denial due to their utility in delivering nuclear warheads. The dual-use nature of space launch vehicle technology provides historical examples, such as India’s adaptation of its SLV-3 for ballistic missiles.

The author criticizes the policy’s reliance on partner assurances without verification mechanisms, calling it a “slippery slope.” Past U.S. exemptions—such as missile sales to Australia and Japan—are cited as evidence of growing inconsistency that could invite reciprocal actions from adversaries.

Das concludes that the policy increases strategic instability, erodes trust in U.S. nonproliferation commitments, and complicates any future arms control efforts—particularly under a Trump administration seeking rapprochement with Russia and China.

A more bullish take on MTCR reform

In a more bullish take on the MTCR Revisions, Sean Wilson at CSIS contends in a recent report that the previous posture “locked in a strategic disadvantage for the United States without meaningfully advancing U.S. nonproliferation objectives.” Notably, it encouraged allies such as the Republic of Korea to rely on “Russian suppliers for space technologies.” The new policy is characterized not as weakening controls, but as “expanding the ability of the United States to benefit from technology transfer to—and among—its close allies and partners.”

Wilson outlines three areas for implementation:

1. Easing Regulations: Align export rules using mechanisms such as the AUKUS framework and 2024 space export reform proposals. Current draft rules contain “deficiencies in [their] understanding of the contemporary global commercial space market,” risking competitive disadvantages for U.S. providers.
2.  Clarifying Eligible Nations: There is “broad public uncertainty” about which partners qualify for favorable treatment. While AUKUS partners and India appear to be included, a broader list should be considered, including NATO allies, Major Non-NATO Allies, and strategic partners like Ukraine.
3. Further Reform of the MTCR: The MTCR must be updated to reflect contemporary realities. Wilson notes the need for “differentiating ballistic missiles from commercial SLVs,” separating drones from cruise missiles, and possibly excluding drones altogether from the regime. If consensus cannot be reached among partners, “the United States would reserve the right to issue a unilateral policy announcement.”