BIS added 11 Chinese entities to the Entity List, 10 for advanced artificial intelligence research and one for development of lithography technology for advanced-node fabrication facilities. The committee also removed three Indian nuclear research entities after diplomatic considerations. …
Alan Estevez, Undersecretary of Commerce for Industry and Security, delivered remarks Tuesday at Washington's CSIS Wadhwani AI Center, focusing on the evolving role of export controls in safeguarding U.S. national security and addressing technological threats. The conversation, moderated by Greg Allen, Director of CSIS's Wadhwani AI Center, covered key achievements, challenges, and future priorities for the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).
The Biden Administration released its proposed "AI Diffusion Rule" monday morning, aiming to control exports of chips used for artificial intelligence. Quotas will restrict the number of chips to be exported to about 120 countries, while a short list of G-7 and other allied countries are exempt from restrictions. Sales to China, Iran, Russia & North Korea are blocked. The limits focus on Advanced Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) used to train AI models. Cloud services providers like AWS and Microsoft will enjoy some waivers from the rules, in a material concession to the data center industry. Cloud providers will have geographic limits, ensuring no more than half their computing power resides offshore.
January 6th, The Commerce Department added 13 entities to the Entity List under the destinations of Burma (1), China, People's Republic of (China) (11), and Pakistan (1). The Chinese firms were added for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of China's military modernization. In addition, these entities have "demonstrable ties to activities of concern, including hypersonic weapons development, design and modeling of vehicles in hypersonic flight, using proprietary software to model weapons design and damage; and otherwise supporting China's military-civil fusion efforts," according to the Commerce Department. The entities are added with a license requirement for the export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) of all items subject to the EAR and a license review policy of presumption of denial.
The United States has adjusted its policy on implementing the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to expand access to some weapons for its allies, the White House said. Now, the US authorities must show greater flexibility in considering each specific case of export of such technologies, and facilitate the transfer of "certain MTCR Category I military missiles, Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), and Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) systems to certain partners with strong export control systems."
As the Biden Administration prepares to hand over the reins, there's a palpable sense of urgency to get as much regulatory work done as possible before January 20th. The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) regulatory agenda has dozens of rulemaking actions underway, including further steps targeting the illicit trade in advanced chips. The Global Artificial Intelligence Diffusion" rule aims to control the global shipments of graphics processing units (GPUs) to forestall diversion through third countries. Restrictions are said to include geographic controls as well as a worldwide licensing system that includes reporting requirements and exceptions.
The Bureau of Industry and Security is seeking public comments on regulations addressing risks posed by information and communications technology and services (ICTS) integral to unmanned aircraft systems. BIS seeks public feedback on several matters including: definitions of UAS and components, assessments of how potential classes of ICTS transactions integral to UAS may present undue or unacceptable risks to U.S. national security, evaluations of risk posed by different foreign adversaries, potential processes for the public to request approval to engage in an otherwise prohibited transaction, the economic impact such regulation could have on certain entities, and, where feasible, potential mitigation measures.
On September 6, 2024, BIS published in the Federal Register an interim final rule entitled “Commerce Control List Additions and Revisions; Implementation of Controls on Advanced Technologies Consistent with Controls Implemented by International Partners” that contained inadvertent errors. This rule corrects those errors.
A report from the Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) has revealed critical failures in the United States’ semiconductor export control regime, underscoring its inability to curb the flow of critical technologies to adversaries such as China and Russia. The findings highlight significant deficiencies in the enforcement capabilities of the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) and inadequate compliance efforts by U.S.-based semiconductor manufacturers, according to the authors.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is amending the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to implement changes agreed to by Australia Group (AG) member countries at recent meetings. These include controlling: instruments for the automated chemical synthesis of peptides (automated peptide synthesizers), dipropylamine, and neosaxitoxin; and revising the controls for botulinum toxins, toxic gas monitors, and centrifugal separators.
A California firm has agreed to pay over $3 million as part of a settlement agreement for unlicensed shipments of transistors to Russia. Because the firm did not regularly review revisions to the EAR they failed to recognize that, as of February 2023, such items required a license for export to Russia.
A new commentary from Barath Harithas and Andreas Schumacher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) provides a single resource guide for understanding U.S. export controls on China from 2022 to 2024. It provides a clear account of the motivations driving U.S. actions in 2022 and identifies a familiar pattern of gaps in 2023 and 2024
A report from The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released December 2nd details the compliance challenges faced by U.S. companies subject to new export control rules for advanced semiconductors and related manufacturing equipment.
For the first time in fifteen years, the State Department proposes to revise and increase the registration fees charged to those required to register with DDTC. During the 45-day public comment period, the feedback, primarily from individuals and small businesses, raised concerns about the financial burden on small enterprises, barriers to entry, and the disproportionate impact on manufacturers who must register to meet private-sector contracting requirements.
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is seeking public comments on the impact that implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), through the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 and the Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations (CWCR), has had on commercial activities involving “Schedule 1” chemicals during calendar year 2024. Schedule 1 chemicals are chemicals that are considered a high risk to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and have little to no peaceful use. They include chemicals that have been used as weapons, such as sarin, mustard, VX, and ricin, as well as precursor chemicals that can be used to produce these chemicals
Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a final rule cementing the procedures it will follow in investigating foreign adversary threats to information and communications technology and services (ICTS) transactions that may harm U.S. national security
Among other actions, the semiconductor equipment related controls announced Monday include amendments to the Temporary General Licenses (TGL) in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). An update has been made to AES to revise License Code C65 “Temporary General License” (TGL) permitting certain parts, components or equipment. New controls on high-bandwidth memory units under ECCN 3A090.c, and also creates a License Exception High Bandwidth Memory (HBM). A new License Exception Restricted Fabrication Facility (RFF)
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced a package of rules designed to further impair China’s capability to produce advanced-node semiconductors that can be used in the next generation of advanced weapon systems and in artificial intelligence and advanced computing. In response, the Chinese government imposed further restrictions on the export of "dual use" commodities banning sales of gallium, germanium, antimony and tightening controls on graphite exports. The BIS controls target some, but not all affiliates of chip manufacturers SMIC and Huawei, as well as semiconductor manufacturing equipment manufacturers in the PRC.
On November 26, 2024, the Department extended the temporary modification of the Note to paragraph (h)(1) of USML Category VIII with regard to certain commodities used in the KF-21 aircraft or variants thereof.
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published a final rule imposing new controls on exports, reexports, and transfers (in-country) involving six key categories of items – some of which were previously controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons – to Pakistan to address diversion concerns.