Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI) is seeking to find support for legislation restricting federally funded research collaborations with entities on U.S. government restricted lists, releasing a report that challenges objections to stronger safeguards and a supplemental collection of historical investigative records.
Moolenaar, chairman of the House Select Committee on China, said the report supports passage of the Securing Innovation and Research from Adversaries Act, or SIRA. His October 13 release presents the legislation as a means of establishing consistent federal restrictions and preventing taxpayer-funded research from benefiting organizations identified as national security risks.
The committee report disputes the arguments that stronger restrictions would impair academic freedom, slow innovation, impose excessive administrative burdens, or duplicate adequate university controls. It also recommends stronger monitoring after awards, consistent federal standards, incentives for institutions that adopt safeguards, and greater use of suspension and debarment when supported by investigative findings.
“Congress must pass the SIRA Act to establish clear, consistent safeguards across the federal government,” Moolenaar said in the release.
The latest legislative records located show both standalone bills at the committee-referral stage. Moolenaar introduced H.R. 8901 on May 19, and it was referred to the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Sen. Jim Banks (R-IN) introduced S. 4525 on May 14; it was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. No subsequent standalone passage or enactment was located.
A separate effort to attach SIRA provisions to the fiscal 2027 National Defense Authorization Act did not result in their inclusion in the House-passed version, according to an August 5 update from the Association of Public and Land-grant Universities. APLU identified the amendment as a concern because it would further restrict international research partnerships.
The House proposal would prohibit federal research funds from supporting collaborations with listed entities or individuals associated with them.
Its definition of collaboration extends to co-authorship, data and material sharing, joint laboratories, visiting scholars, personnel exchanges, and joint supervision of students. Agency heads could grant case-specific waivers for specified national security, scientific, or public health purposes. House bill text
For participants, that scope would bring routine research relationships within the proposed restrictions. Universities and other recipients would need to examine collaborators’ institutional affiliations and determine whether activities conducted under federal awards involved covered entities. Government-wide implementation guidance would establish compliance requirements and enforcement mechanisms.
Academic organizations have raised concerns about international collaboration restrictions, although their statements address different proposals. APLU’s update expressly discusses SIRA.
In separate August 26 commentary, the Association of American Universities challenged proposed Office of Management and Budget grant rules, arguing that broad restrictions could obstruct fundamental research and reduce access to international expertise, facilities, and data. Those comments concern OMB’s proposal and do not establish AAU’s position on SIRA.
Existing federal research security processes address improper foreign influence. An independent review by the Government Accountability Office identified weaknesses in protections against discrimination. In its January 2026 report, GAO found that while the five largest funders of extramural research had adopted nondiscrimination safeguards to varying degrees, none had assessed whether those safeguards provided reasonable assurance against discrimination. The agencies were Defense, Energy, NASA, NIH, and NSF.
The concern is whether research security reviews unfairly target scientists because of their race, ethnicity, or national origin, particularly scientists of Chinese or Asian descent. GAO’s findings identify an oversight gap; they do not establish that every review was discriminatory.
Xenophobic and anti-Chinese policies may have unintended consequences. Chinese scholars conduct much leading-edge research, and the United States remains a major beneficiary of internationally trained talent.
A September 23 study by Carnegie Endowment researchers Damien Ma and Binyi Yang found that 57 percent of researchers in its 2025 elite AI cohort received their undergraduate degrees in China, compared with 13 percent in the United States. The share of Chinese-trained researchers working in China rose from 57 percent in the 2022 cohort to 69 percent in 2025. The findings underscore the importance of attracting researchers alongside protecting research, although the study does not assess SIRA’s likely effects.
As supplemental support, the committee released 711 pages of NSF Office of Inspector General records from 20 cases, some dating to 2019. The file documents research compliance concerns, but allegations, administrative findings, and court outcomes carry different weight. The records alone neither establish research theft in every case nor demonstrate that SIRA would prevent similar conduct.
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